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UK
Hits Worst Deflation on Record
By
Adrian Ash BullionVault
January
25, 2010
Where-oh-where might the UK find enough
money to reverse this deflation...?
SO AT LEAST we know now that the Bank of England isn't
front-running its personal accounts or pension scheme with inside
information, writes Adrian Ash at BullionVault.
Because the Old Lady isn't even front-running her own data before
she speaks in public...
"The unprecedented actions of the Monetary Policy Committee to
inject £200 billion directly into the economy – described by some
as 'quantitative
easing' – have averted a potentially disastrous monetary
squeeze," said governor Mervyn
King in a speech on Tuesday.
Barely 36 hours later, Thursday's money-supply
figures said otherwise. And bluntly.

December '09 saw the broad money supply in the UK – known as M4,
and encompassing all private UK holdings of Sterling notes &
coins, all Sterling deposits held at mainland banks & building
societies, and all certificates of deposit, commercial paper &
debt securities issued by UK banks and building societies of up to 5
years' maturity – shrink at the fastest pace on record.
Down by almost £22 billion, this deflation (technically defined as
a contraction in the money supply, rather than a drop in shop prices
as the press seems to think) came even as the Bank of England
created £6.8bn from thin air, and spent it on government bonds in
its bid to inflate our way out of recession, "easing with
quantity".
One month's data, of course, doesn't need to mean much (or so Mervyn
King says). The December figures are still "provisional",
and the net loss of money is nothing, as yet, to the money deflation
of 25% that hit the United States during the Great Depression.
Indeed, it only just beats, on a monthly basis, the drop in M4 of
autumn 1997. And the data available only runs back to 1963 – so
titling this piece he "worst deflation on record" is
tabloid, we confess. But then, so is The Times.
Furthermore, a good chunk of that "injection" from
Threadneedle's electronic equivalent of the printing-press no doubt
went to foreign gilt-owners, looking to quit UK government debt and
finding a ready buyer in the Bank of England. The quantitative
easing surely didn't stay here at home, not without last month's
true deflation – absent the Old Lady's ex nihilo cash – standing
at 24% rather than 18% of December's entire economic output.
But either way, the Bank's queasing was dwarfed by the volume of
money which quit the UK last month. And whether this Christmas's net
withdrawal of cash went east to pay for Chinese toys...or north to
pay for Norwegian spruce...a far greater tide of money will continue
to ebb out of the UK over the coming weeks, months and years, we
guess here at BullionVault,
as the world's most indebted nation is forced to settle a much
larger bill.
The £647 billion – more than 45% of annual GDP – currently owed
by private households and business which doesn't actually exist here
at home.

You see, it wasn't only Northern Rock that used the international
money markets and foreign investment fund buyers to finance its
runaway lending in the "boom" of 1997-2007.
As our chart shows, UK banks somehow lent private borrowers £803
billion more than they held in customer deposits by the spring of
2009. And this excess of debt over money – what the Bank of
England has cheerfully called a "funding gap" – was
plugged in good part by foreign creditors.
This in itself was not new. The kindness of strangers first stepped
in to help giddy-up the Lawson Boom of the mid-to-late '80s. But
settling around £100bn as the housing crash of 1989-1995 then
struck, their cumulative largesse peaked below 25% of GDP...a
sizeable chunk, but not enough to flee back overseas when that
particular bubble went bust.
Whereas in the first decade of the 21st century, in contrast, Tokyo
pension funds, Manhattan investment banks and other third-party
creditors from around the world wound up owning Tyneside buy-to-let
debt and Bluewater credit-card bills worth 56% of GDP at the top,
half of it held as securitized bonds.

"[The] banks have come to rely heavily upon wholesale funding,
rather than deposits from customers," noted Professor David
Miles, the latest career academic to join the Old Lady's policy
team, in a speech of Sept. '09.
But "a substantial part of this wholesale funding proved
footloose and hard to replace once fears about the strength of the
banking sector emerged," as Miles said – and as Northern
Rock proved all too clearly.
In the last 8 months of its private existence, Northern Rock's total
net lending rose 43% from the same period a year before. New
residential home loans were 55% greater – not that shareholders
bothered to question how or why until the thing toppled over and the
board begged the Bank of England for help. What the Financial
Times called "an alternative banking model" was
applied in extremis at New Labour's favorite ex-mutual. Northern
Rock got 43% of its funding from the wholesale debt securitization
market, parceling up mortgages and credit-card debts to sell onto
pension and insurance funds, foreign banks and overseas governments.
That compared with the UK bank average of 7%, according to the FT.
Based on the Bank of England's own data, however, securitization
accounted for 10% of all UK bank lending outstanding by the time
Northern became Narodny Rock. It peaked at 12% by late winter
2008/09, and stands above 9% today. Overall, the "funding
gap" peaked at 30% of the UK's entire bank-loan book, only
reducing to 24% today. Meaning that almost £1 in every £4 owed by
private households and business first came not from the bank savings
of other households and business, but from those
"alternative" sources which have turned "footloose
and hard to replace" now the global credit boom's croaked.
Who can redeem, or even merely refinance, this outstanding net debt?
As it is – and as it has been for the last 25 years, in fact –
the UK couldn't settle its obligations today, not even if every
saver agreed to give up their cash. Because the total volume of debt
is greater by almost one-third than the actual volume of Sterling
currently held here in Britain. Even excluding the government's
fast-swelling debts, the UK economy now owes more cash than exists
inside it.
Yes, we've been constantly in hock since Dec. 1984. But that doesn't
mean we can bear any size of net debt – and as the money leaks
out...going overseas to repay what once seemed the kindness of
strangers...UK deflation at home is guaranteed. Unless we can find a
new, happy-to-keep-flowing source of money from nowhere, that is.
Adrian
Ash runs the
research desk at BullionVault,
the world's No.1 private investor gold service online.
Formerly head of editorial at Fleet Street Publications –
London's top publisher of financial advice for private
investors – he was City correspondent for The
Daily Reckoning from 2003 to 2008, and is now a regular
contributor to 321gold,
FinancialSense,
GoldSeek,
Prudent
Bear, SafeHaven
and Whiskey
& Gunpowder among many other leading investment
websites. Adrian's views on the Gold
Market have been sought by leading news organizations
including the Financial Times, the Economist,
Bloomberg and Der Stern in Germany.
Paul
Tustain is the
editor of www.Galmarley.com
and director of BullionVault.
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